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In the case of European Union and its international actorness, norms and normative 
interpretations galore. Not only is the Union often seen as a “civilian” or “normative” 
power – in essence a force for good in the world – but also the work of the scholars 
studying the phenomenon itself is often riven with different normative assumptions and 
agendas. Normativity is of course something we can hardly escape or do without: as 
social beings normative assumptions are the equivalent of our biological DNA – it is the 
very fabric of our existence (for a discussion, see Frost, 2001). But unlike in the case of 
genes, which will affect our phenotype whether we like it or not, our normative 
assumptions we can reflect upon, scrutinise and debate.
1 As such, our normative ideas 
can be amended or rejected and the role given to them in building social scientific 
explanations can vary in terms of intensity and the degree of consciousness attached to 
utilising the concepts. 
 
This is not the place to settle the role of norms and normativity in the study of 
International Relations (IR). Suffice it to say, that although always present in our 
accounts, the role given to them can vary significantly. As such, we do not have to depart 
from normative assumptions about the EU’s inherent goodness but we can, and indeed 
should, seek to address these issues as empirical questions to be examined in their own 
right. Having said this, treating the EU as an a priori qualitatively new, and better, 
international entity has a long pedigree. François Duchêne’s “civilian power Europe” was 
perhaps the first occasion when the special role of the then European Community in the 
world was sketched out (Duchêne, 1973). More recently, the most prominent expression 
of this normativity has been the work of Ian Manners – the topic of two especially 
dedicated panels in this Conference. 
 
Manners’ ideas have proven to be highly influential but also equally controversial (for an 
earlier attempt at fully dissecting his ideas, see the special number of Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006). I myself have found his work inspirational although 
it has spurred my own thinking into directions which Manners himself might not approve. 
The reason for this stems from the fact that for Manners, the normative power Europe 
(NPE) was never an analytical device but a normative one. It was not meant to portray 
the EU and its international role as it is (or was) but as it should be: “It was, and is, a 
statement of what is believed to be good about the EU; a statement which needed to be 
made in order to stimulate and reflect on what the EU should be (doing) in world 
politics.” (Manners, 2006b, p. 168, emphasis in the original). 
 
If this indeed is the case (although it did not come across very clearly in the original 
statement which made the analytical case for “conceiving” the EU as a normative power, 
                                                 
* Previous drafts or ideas relating to this paper have been discussed in the Research Seminar, Department of 
Political Science, University of Turku, November 2005; the ERI Seminar at the University of Birmingham, 
March 2006; and the 4
th CEEISA Convention in Tartu, June 2006. I want to thank all the participants on 
these previous occasions for challenging and consequently improving my ideas. The usual disclaimer 
applies.  
1 To be sure, genes we can – and often do – debate as well but always informed by a certain set of 
normative ideas and criteria.   3
see Manners, 2002, esp. p. 252), then it does not make sense to dissect his argument in 
terms of its realism – i.e. how well it captures its object. In fact, this is not even attempted 
on this occasion as it already has been done on others (see, for example, Diez, 2005; 
Sjursen, 2006 as well as the other contributions in the same Special Issue). Instead, and as 
was already mentioned, the paper takes the NPE argument as its starting point but seeks 
to develop it into three different directions. First, instead of making a claim concerning 
how the EU should be or act, the paper seeks to make a statement – or build a 
hypothetical model – about how it indeed is currently acting. Second, whereas Manners 
was largely interested in how the normative power Europe affected the wider global 
normative space, this paper adopts a more regional focus examining how the EU operates 
its normative power in Europe and how that power is in fact uniquely circumscribed by 
that very same regional context. Finally, and this is where the differences with Manners 
become perhaps most accentuated, whereas Manners emphasised the normative, this 
paper puts the onus on power. 
 
Having said this, it is imperative to note at the outset that the paper does not seek to put 
forth a structural realist variant of the Union’s normative reach (for such a treatment, see 
Hyde-Price, 2006). Instead, the paper seeks to develop a multi-causal model where both 
ideational and material forms of power come together in explaining the peculiarities of 
the EU’s normative power in Europe. By doing so, the paper challenges the Mannersian 
notion of normative power by arguing that his scheme is based on too passive an 
understanding of the EU as a norm entrepreneur in international relations. Instead of 
relying on passive diffusion alone, the EU is taking more active measures in promoting 
its norms and values. This is so especially in Europe, where the Union’s enlargement can 
be seen as the main instrument of its normative power. In fact, the EU can be envisaged 
as a regional normative hegemon that is using its economic and normative clout to build a 
set of highly asymmetrical bilateral relationships that help to facilitate an active 
transference of its norms and values. However, the Union’s ability to project its 
normative power rests not (only) on coercion, but is crucially dependent on the perceived 
legitimacy of the Union’s actions in the eyes of its partners. It is argued that the open-
ended nature of the Union’s membership is a key factor in promoting this legitimacy in 
Europe. 
 
The paper is divided into three parts: First, the role of enlargement as the primary vehicle 
for the Union’s normative power in Europe is discussed. Next, the prospects of ENP in 
alleviating some of the likely problems and shortcomings are briefly analysed. The 
emphasis is put on the Union’s Eastern neighbourhood as it is the main forum on which 
the Union’s claims for normative hegemony in Europe will be put to a test in the future. 
As such, Ukraine is selected as a case to be discussed, as it can – due to its size and 
location alone – be seen as the litmus test for the viability of the Union’s new approach. 





   4
Enlargement and the EU’s Normative Power in Europe 
 
The successive rounds of enlargements are a factor shaping the European Union. The 
previous enlargements
2 have all resulted not only in an increase in quantity – member 
states, population, the size of economy, etc. – but they have also ushered in qualitative 
changes in the Union’s agenda, institutions and decision-making, as well as shaping the 
ways in which the external world has perceived the European integration and its different 
manifestations, be they institutions or policies (Ginsberg, 1998; Ginsberg, 1989, pp. 151–
152). There is dialectic at work, where the “shadow of enlargement” (Friis, 1999) 
compels the EU and its member states to adapt their own dynamic to meet the changing 
circumstances (Haukkala and Ojanen, 2002, p. 204; see also Vobruba, 2005). This 
adaptation – together with the geographic exposure to new neighbours – starts the 
dialectic anew by creating an opening and a demand for further enlargements. 
 
This intricate interplay between the internal and external facets of European integration 
has meant that the Union’s enlargement has been seen as one of its most effective foreign 
policy tools (Vachudova, 2005
3). From the vantage of point of European foreign policy, 
enlargement can be seen as having basically two main functions. First, it acts as an 
instrument through which the Union can seek to enhance stability in its immediate 
neighbourhood. In its policies, the EU acts in a manner similar to any regional power that 
has a stake in preserving stability on its doorstep (Missiroli, 2004). The EU has often 
used enlargement as an instrument in locking its neighbours into stable and democratic 
transition. This was the case with Greece, Portugal and Spain, and the same logic applied 
in the recent Eastern enlargement as well. Especially in the post-Cold War era the Union 
has come to acknowledge the indivisibility of security in Europe: the EU cannot feel 
secure and continue to prosper if the rest of the continent is in a downward spiral towards 
increased insecurity and poverty. The European Security Strategy is based on this line of 
argument (European Council, 2003). It is also the starting point for the EU’s new 
European Neighbourhood Policy, ENP (European Commission, 2003, p. 3). 
 
Second, the enlargement process acts as a conduit through which the EU as a normative 
power Europe (as defined in Manners, 2002) can project its norms and values in a way 
that is both efficient and legitimate. It is only through the unique and rich combination of 
stick and carrots that are present in the accession process that the EU can exert the 
strongest normative influence on its partners. The key here is to appreciate the fact that 
the EU enlargement is not only about drawing geographical boundaries; it is also about 
establishing, or imposing, an EU order in Europe through the transference and diffusion 
of EU norms, values, rules, and regulations (Aalto, 2006; Christiansen et al., 2000; Diez 
and Whitman, 2002; Friis and Murphy, 1999; Lavenex, 2004; Smith, 1996). It is true, as 
Christiansen et al. (2000) have argued, that this can result in certain “fuzziness” in the 
                                                 
2 “The Original Six” (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) have been 
joined by Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (1973); Greece (1981); Portugal and Spain (1986); 
Austria, Finland, and Sweden (1995); Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia (2004); and Bulgaria and Romania (2007). 
3 Also the Union acknowledges this. For example, the communication on neighbourhood policy states, that 
the enlargement has “unarguably” been the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument (European 
Commission, 2003, p. 5). For the current enlargement commissioner’s view, see Rehn, 2006.   5
composition of the EU, as important parts of the Union, such as the Community 
legislation, the Single Market, or the Schengen acquis are through the pre-accession 
instruments and the European Economic Area (EEA) mechanism extended beyond its 
borders. This ties in well with Ole Wæver’s “imperial analogy,” according to which the 
“EU Empire” can establish its rule in a radial manner through differing zones of order 
(Wæver, 1997, p. 64). The imperial analogy is useful in highlighting the fact that the EU 
perhaps need not have to accept new members perpetually in order to be able to impose 
its normative order on others. Or, to use Michael Smith’s terminology, the EU can 
modify its transactional boundary in order to accommodate its new neighbours whilst 
seeking to preserve the integrity of its institutional/legal boundary at the same time 
(Smith, 1996, pp. 13–17; see also Friis and Murphy, 1999). As such, the EU is seeking to 
use the creation of new “grey zones” in Europe in order to control the problems that stem 
from neighbouring areas without having to grant them full membership and European 
identity (Palosaari, 2001). 
 
But the issue is not as straightforward as the debate above would seem to suggest. The 
previous experience has already shown that the EU has not in fact been very successful in 
projecting its normative power in cases where full membership has not been on the cards. 
This is due to the internal constraints inherent in the Union’s own actorness and 
especially the key role played by enlargement as the main instrument of the Union’s 
normative power in Europe: The EU’s expectations of normative convergence and 
harmonisation in Europe are seen as legitimate and warranted mainly only when the 
golden carrot of accession is on the cards. Once it is not, the situation is radically altered, 
and the EU’s possibility to act as an anchor for reforms has proven to be severely limited 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 137). This has been equally true in the East, as 
exemplified by the cases of Russia (Haukkala, 2007) and Ukraine (Wolczuk, 2004), as 
well as in the Union’s Southern periphery in the Mediterranean (Holden, 2005; Tovias 
and Ugur, 2004). 
 
The EU as an active norm entrepreneur 
 
In his seminal article, Ian Manners suggested that the EU’s normative power is diffused 
through contagion and transference (Manners, 2002, pp. 244–45; see also Manners, 
2006a; 2006b). To be fair, for Manners the notion of normative power has to remain free 
of any forms of coercion; it is a conceptual move necessitated by his own normative 
agenda (for a discussion, see Manners, 2006b). But when taken on its own terms, 
Manners’s scheme betrays too static and passive an understanding of the EU’s role as an 
actual norm entrepreneur in international relations. Instead of relying on passive diffusion 
alone, the EU has in fact actively sought to project and promote its norms and values 
internationally. This is true especially in Europe where enlargement and more specifically 
the highly institutionalised and structured accession process has been the main instrument 
of the Union’s normative power. Vachudova (2005, p. 63) has made a useful distinction 
between passive and active leverage that the EU enjoys over its credible future members: 
passive by the overall attraction of EU membership, and active from the deliberate 
conditionality exercised by the Union during the pre-accession process. It is, however, 
important to take note that it is the active component that is the key to understanding the   6
Union’s leverage, as previous studies have shown that it is only through clear (material) 
incentives and the concrete prospect of a full membership and European identity that the 
EU can effect substantial economic and societal change in its European partners. Other 
forms of leverage, such as social influence and transnational mobilization have proven 
largely ineffective (Vachudova, 2005; Schimmelfennig et al., 2003).  
 
When viewed from the viewpoint of prospective members, a credible offer of 
membership is crucial in three respects: First, it lends the Union’s demands of accepting 
its normative agenda legitimacy in the eyes of the candidates. It is only by offering a full 
stake in European institutions and identity that the Union can expect others to subscribe 
in full to its norms and values. Second, it offers politicians in the candidate countries the 
political cover under which they can make the at times difficult and even painful 
domestic reforms while claiming that the steps are necessary, as indeed they often are, in 
order to be able to enjoy the fruits of European integration in full. And finally, the 
accession process gives not only political but also economic and technical support and 
aid to the transformation of the candidates. This support is on entirely different scale 
compared to the other external assistance schemes of the Union. 
 
From the vantage point of EU’s normative power, the accession process is also 
beneficial. The Union in effect uses its economic and normative clout to create a set of 
highly asymmetrical bilateral relationships between itself and the candidates where the 
projection of norms and values is entirely one-sided: The candidates are supposed to 
internalise not only the approximately 80,000 pages of acquis communautaire but also 
the value-basis of the Union, as exemplified in the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 which 
sets out the other prerequisites for European belonging and full accession. 
 
In fact, this approach to enlargement reveals that Manners’s assumptions about the 
crucially different character of EU’s actorness have to be clarified with some further 
remarks. The crux of the issue is indeed to be found from what Manners has described as 
the Union’s “ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations” 
(Manners, 2002, p. 239). In Europe, this ability is augmented by the fact that the EU has 
not only power to set the parameters over the legitimate aspects of international (and also 
domestic) life in general, but that it also has the recourse of being able to claim almost a 
sole monopoly on what can be called “Europeanness.” The Union seems to enjoy the 
authority of pronouncing what it means, and perhaps more importantly what it takes, to 
be “European.” But this is a mixed blessing for the Union. On one hand it has given the 
Union almost unprecedented (normative) power over societies in Europe. But on the 
other hand, this monopoly has manifested itself in the continued pull of membership that 
the Union attracts over its neighbours that is now beginning to make the Union itself ill at 
ease. Therefore, at least in the case of the European Union there is more to the 
enlargement of regional integration than negative externalities and rational calculus (cf. 
Mattli, 1999): The current state of affairs implies that the enlargement of the EU deals not 
only with the material side of European integration but also with more profound 
questions of belonging and identity. As a consequence, in Europe the Union has great 
difficulties in unbundling its normative power from the notion of Europeanness and 
consequently questions of (full) membership. This is why it is facing such a hard time   7
when hoping to relinquish enlargement without inflicting serious damage to its 
(self)image as “The European Project.” In this respect, the President of the Commission 
Romano Prodi’s remark about the EU’s willingness to share “everything but institutions” 
(Prodi, 2002, see more below) with its neighbours is both disingenious and misses the 
point: As an identity project the Union has a hard time sharing what is perhaps its most 
essential characteristic, Europeanness, with its neighbours without also sharing its 
insitutions and membership in full.  
 
In a sense, the EU can be seen as a regional normative hegemon (see also Diez, 2005, p. 
616; Hyde-Price, 2006, pp. 226−227). Interestingly, this claim ties in with the work of a 
well-known offensive realist John Mearsheimer, who has argued that one reading of the 
last three centuries of international politics is to envisage it as a continuous struggle 
between Great Powers for regional – as opposed to global, which is in essence impossible 
– hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 40−42). To a degree, the EU can be seen as playing 
the same game, although it is doing so in a different way and perhaps for different 
reasons as well (for an eloquent semi-official exposition, see Cooper, 2003). In this 
respect, the label of regional normative hegemon would seem to be an apt one: 
Normative, as its foreign policy agenda is laden with norms and values, and a hegemon, 
as it seeks and seems to enjoy a monopoly on defining what those norms are and entail 
and thus create the boundaries of normality and Europeanness. 
 
It is not, however, entirely clear why the EU has decided to marry its normative agenda 
and “foreign policy” so tightly. For Manners, the answer stems from the Union’s own 
character: from what it is rather than what it does (Manners, 2002). Indeed, part of the 
reason undoubtedly stems from the Union’s own historical experience and identity as “a 
European civilising process” (Linklater 2005) that is seen as entailing that the Union 
itself must act as a qualitatively different entity in international relations as well (Diez 
and Whitman, 2002; Smith, 2001
4). But other reasons can be found as well. The Union is 
a complex legal animal (although not yet an entity), and one that seems to have problems 
in interacting with other international actors that do not work on the basis of the same 
norms, standards and procedures. Granting third countries access to the highly legalised 
and institutionalised Single Market is no simple matter but it requires a large degree of 
normative approximation, even harmonisation, on the part of those seeking that access 
(Cremona, 1998). The EU’s emphasis is not, however, unique, as it can be seen as part 
and parcel of the global processes of creating multilateral rules of the game as 
exemplified by the WTO processes as well as the wider post-Cold War debates about 
“good governance” and second wave of conditionality (Haukkala, 2007). 
 
In a sense, the Union’s normative power in Europe is reminiscent of the Lukesian third 
dimension of power:  
 
To put the matter sharply, A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what 
he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, 
shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of 
                                                 
4 Also the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe makes references to this (Title V, Chapter I, 
Article III-292).   8
power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, 
to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? (Lukes, 
1974/2005, p. 27) 
 
In essence, the accession process can be seen as perhaps the most complete 
operationalisation of the Lukesian third dimension of power or the attempt at normative 
hegemony, to use the parlance of this paper. Having said this, the fact that the accession 
process is based on this logic does not entail that the actual accession process and 
especially the negotiation phase would be free of power and coercion. In fact, the reverse 
is the case with the EU and its member states often bargaining very hard and forcing the 
applicants to conform to a process that entails deep-ranging societal reforms, partial 
erosion – or at least pooling – of sovereignty, and accepting accession treaties that do not 
necessarily meet their short-term economic interests. Crucially, however, it is the 
expectation of future benefits associated with the full membership and the possibility to 
have a voice in the EU and its institutions that makes this process legitimate, or at least 
bearable, for the applicants (Ellison, 2006; see also Zielonka, 2006, Ch. Two). 
 
But the Union’s claim at hegemony is only regional in its scope as it is most specifically 
confined to Europe where the prospect of EU membership acts as both the source of 
attraction and legitimacy to the Union’s normative power. This is not to say that the 
Union does not try to apply the same principles outside of Europe as well. In fact, the 
Union’s approach is not confined to Europe alone, as in general the Union prefers 
bilateral relationships with third parties that enable it to enjoy the asymmetric leverage 
often afforded by its economic and normative power (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, pp. 
78−79). Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004, p. 231) have suggested that this is in fact a fairly 
shrewd strategy on the part of the Union: the Union is “playing to its strenghts” and 
applying its commercial power and attraction to promote its normative power in the 
international system. 
 
But these remarks fail to distinguish between the Union’s normative power globally and 
regionally in Europe. Although the EU is seeking to build highly asymmetrical 
relationships with its partners in Europe, it is crucial to understand that they are not based 
on coercion and domination alone. The gist of the issue has been captured fairly well by 
Mark Leonard. According to him, Europe’s “transformative power” is “broad and deep: 
once sucked into its sphere, countries are changed forever… Europe doesn’t change 
countries by threatening to invade them: its biggest threat is to cut off contact with them.” 
(Leonard, 2005, p. 110). Leonard’s remarks show how the Union’s normative power 
resides in a delicate nexus of attraction, coercion and legitimacy. As such, it is 
reminiscent of Antonio Gramsci’s hegemonic discourse where an actor seeks to define its 
own “interests as general interests and in using this concept to formulate general ideas on 
the order and development of society” (Brand, 2005, p. 171). In this perspective, a 
successful hegemony actually results in a situation where the relationship is largely void 
of the naked exercise of power with the ideas, values and institutions of the hegemon 
being seen as both natural and legitimate instead (Gill and Law, 1988, p. 78). But herein 
lays the catch for the Union: The EU might have, as Manners has argued, the power to set 
the parameters of normality and it might have some means of projecting its vision also   9
internationally but the limits of the Union’s influence are conditioned by the need for this 
exercise to be seen as legitimate. The experience so far has shown that the only way the 
Union can legitimately project is normative power in Europe is by offering a full stake in 
European institutions and identity, i.e. membership in the European Union itself. 
 
To be sure, to argue that the Union’s normative power is dependent on the perceived 
legitimacy of its actions and policies in the eyes of its partners is hardly a groundbreaking 
finding. The same of course applies to any international actor where the attraction of their 
“soft power,” or “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion 
or payments” (Nye, 2004, p. x, see also p. 5) is conditioned by the perceived external 
legitimacy of the policies the given actor itself undertakes. But it is worth emphasising 
that at least in Europe the EU has an additional structural constraint compared to, for 
example, the United States: The Union is not a state actor that can apply its “soft power” 
at will, but it is a regional integration process to which the ‘objects’ of that power can, 
and often do, aspire to join before accepting its norms and values as entirely legitimate. 
 
This tendency has been fuelled by the Union’s own rhetoric. Since its inception it has 
been committed to keeping its membership open to “any European state” that respects the 
founding values and principles of the Union.
5 As a consequence, a large part of the EU’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of third parties stems from the fact that at least until recently 
European integration has been a geographically open-ended “European project” and 
enlarging the Union has been the best way of countering the oft-voiced concerns of a 
“Fortress Europe” and thus ensuring the legitimacy as well as stability in the EU’s own 
immediate environment. 
 
The difficulties in ceasing to enlarge 
 
Now, in the aftermath of the latest rounds of enlargement in May 2004 and January 2007, 
the Union’s willingness and ability to enlarge further seems to be increasingly in doubt. 
Some commentators have even rushed to speak about “the death of enlargement” 
(Rachman, 2006).
6 Often the Union’s reluctance to embrace ever new candidates is 
framed in terms of the Union’s “absorption capacity” (for critical treatments concerning 
the idea, see Rehn, 2006; Emerson, 2006). When it comes to the limits of its enlargement, 
the stakes are high indeed for the Union. In the words of one British analyst: “Inclusion 
means bridging the old Cold War divide and uniting a continent, but could end up 
shredding the carefully woven fabric of the Union itself. Exclusion means isolating 
countries that can ill afford isolation, and making a mockery of the very term ‘European 
union’.” (Smith, 2005, p. 757) The EU officials seem to concur. In the words of former 
President of the European Commission Romano Prodi: “[w]e cannot go on enlarging 
forever. We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European 
Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale” (Prodi, 2002). 
                                                 
5 Treaty on European Union, Article 49. Also in the Constitutional Treaty the same commitment can be 
found (Title I, Article I-1.2). 
6 For a dissenting view, see Whitman (2007). For a fascinating study which suggests that the EU in fact 
badly needs further and even radical enlargements in order to keep up with the global power transitions, see 
Yeşilada, Efird and Noordijk, 2006.   10
 
The Cold War and its bipolar overlay served the Western Europeans well, for they could 
take the concept of “Europe” as their own without having to think about where the final 
outer boundaries of European integration really lay (Wallace, 1992, p. 34). Rhetorically, 
the European Community portrayed a pan-European vocation; for example, the Article 
237 of the Treaty of Rome accorded “any European state” the right to apply for 
membership (Schimmelfennig 2003, p. 266). This served of course also a useful 
propaganda purpose by highlighting the key differences between the Western and Soviet 
integration processes in Europe: One was based on voluntary fucntional integration and 
pooling of sovereignty while the other grew from the barrels of the Soviet guns. 
However, with the end of the Cold War the situation changed and the EU was flooded 
with membership applications from a host of Northern, Central and Eastern European 
countries. This incurred that riding on the European card and identity became a much 
more costly exercise. It also meant that the EU had to either start drawing the limits of 
“Europe” or be “shamed” by the rhetorical action of the aspirants into enlarging (about 
rhetorical action and shaming, see Schimmelfennig, 2001 and 2003). Now, nearly twenty 
years since the fall of the wall, the EU has still not been able to decide where its 
boundaries will eventually lie. Instead, the recent wrangling over Turkey’s accession 
negotiations and the growing uneasiness with which the Union has greeted Ukraine’s 
aspirations, seem to verify the point made by William Wallace already in the early 1990s 
that the EU does not really have any clear criteria for determining which countries can 
get in and when enlargement should ultimately stop (Wallace, 1992, p. 40). 
 
As such, the recent “Big Bang” enlargement is only the latest, although a major, step in 
the drawing of the EU’s outer boundaries in a piecemeal fashion. To date the process has 
not reflected any serious pre-meditated strategy on the part of the Union. Instead, it has 
been part and parcel of the dialectical process mentioned at the beginning of this paper 
where it seems that at times the Union has been haplessly caught in the middle of its own 
pan-European rhetoric, internal economic and political success and dynamism, and the 
external pressures and calls for belonging. This has led Wallace more recently to suggest 
that the Union should seek to detach the issue of its membership from more existential 
questions of “cultural – let alone ethnic – limits of Europe.” Instead, the EU should 
approach the issue in a more practical manner, answering the “policy question” of “where 
should the EU end?” (Wallace, 2003, p. 13). Also Karen Smith has argued that the 
current ambiguity concerning the EU’s limits is counterproductive and not boosting its 
leverage. Instead, the reverse is the case, as the Union is repeatedly forced into a 
“reactive and defensive” mode and eventually further enlargements (Smith, 2005, p. 
769). In order to escape from this entrapment, also Smith urges the Union soon to decide 
where its final outer boundaries will eventually lie (Ibid., p. 773). 
 
But things might not be as straightforward as Wallace and Smith both argue. What makes 
the case of the EU interesting, is that as a sui generis entity of regional integration it has 
to take into consideration not only the issue of how best to project its power in order to 
ensure stability and security in its immediate neighbourhood, but also how to project its 
normative power in Europe and elsewhere. Obviously, the point of contact where these 
pressures are felt most urgently is at the outer boundaries of the EU. Previously the   11
countries emerging at the outskirts of the enlarging Union (the “new neighbours”) have 
often also been potential future members. The logic of an empire is partly at work here 
(Zielonka, 2006). But the EU is a reluctant empire, ever aware of the dangers posed by 
the entry of newcomers into the club. Moreover, the EU has not become an empire by the 
traditional means of conquest, but, and to paraphrase Geir Lundestad, rather by means of 
invitation (Lundestad, 1998). Nevertheless, the EU can be seen as having some empire-
like qualities, as each successive enlargement creates new borderlines beyond which the 
EU normative order has to be imposed if the Union is to be secure and able to do business 
with its new neighbours.
7 
 
The factors limiting the expansion of previous empires in world history apply to the “EU 
Empire” as well (for recent treatments about the role of empires in international relations, 
see, for example, Ferguson, 2003 and 2005; and Lieven, 2003). But due to its sui generis 
nature, the Union has some unique concerns as well. Perhaps the most pressing one is the 
internal imperative and the question of the future viability of the EU’s own institutions 
and structures. Already the recent two rounds of twelve new members have spurred 
alarmist tones warning of a possible meltdown of EU’s structures in the post-enlargement 
situation. The words of Romano Prodi quoted above are a case in point. Therefore, it 
seems clear that the EU wants the enlargement soon to stop. But it is at a loss on how to 
go about it. The current Treaty on European Union and the so-called Copenhagen criteria 
do not offer any clear guidance in the matter. The same goes for the Constitutional 
Treaty, which might still be abandoned entirely. Consequently, it seems that it is the 
Luxembourg 1997 decision on an added criteria, that of the readiness of the Union itself 
to accept new members, that is coming to the forefront.
8 In the end of the day it seems 
that instead of “imperial overstretch” it is the danger of an “institutional overstretch” that 
will set the limits of EU enlargement (for more about imperial overstretch, see Kennedy, 
1989, esp. p. 666). 
 
From the vantage point of the Union’s normative power the problem is that this is not a 
very moral argument. It rings of double standards and reinforces the image of the EU as a 
“Fortress Europe” shielding its precious acquis behind the Schengen border. As a 
consequence, by relinquishing enlargement, the EU is in danger of not only losing its 
capacity for effectively stabilizing its nearest neighbours, but it is also in danger of losing 
its legitimacy and justification in the eyes of them (see also Hansen, 2006, p. 130; and 
Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002, p. 782). The EU is thus in a genuine bind: By playing with 
the idea of relinquishing enlargement, the previously open “European project” is 
increasingly perceived from the part of especially EU’s Eastern neighbours as a form of 
exclusion. For them it is about extending a normative and highly institutionalized wall, 
which will isolate them from the rest of Europe (Sherr, 2002, p. 167; Neumann, 1998). 
Therefore it is clear that the EU needs a third way; something to ease it out of the bind of 
                                                 
7 The EU’s zeal for the use of empire-like (normative) power is nothing new, of course. For example, also 
the Roman and the British empires were keen to and adept in exporting their norms, values and modes of 
governance (see Ferguson, 2003 and Holland, 2003, respectively). The crucial difference, however, is, that 
the Union is seeking to project its normative power well beyond the reach of its pilums and maxim guns. 
8 This has been highlighted in the Commission’s most recent enlargement strategy (European Commission, 
2006a, see especially the Annex 1).   12
having to choose between the “ins” and “outs.” Since 2003 the Union has been 
developing a European Neighbourhood Policy that can for all means and purposes be 
seen as an attempt at devising new avenues through which the Union could preserve the 
legitimacy of its normative power and the consequent ability to project stability in its 
neighbourhood while also protecting its institutions, and budget, from an unacceptable 
overload. Next we will examine what are the ENP’s prospects for success in this respect. 
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Substitute for Enlargement 
 
As was already mentioned, the application of the EU’s normative hegemony in Europe is 
by no means confined to its future members alone. During the post-Cold War period the 
Union has built an extensive web of bilateral relationships in Eastern Europe that are 
based on the same set of norms and values as the accession process. For example, the EU 
has negotiated eleven Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with the so-called 
new independent states of the former Soviet Union. Here as well the Union has sought 
the asymmetric bilateral approach but with a crucial difference, as accesssion has not 
been on the cards (but to be precise, not all of the post-Soviet states have aspired for 
membership, either). As a consequence, the key component of the Union’s active 
leverage, political conditionality, has been weak and inefficient (see Smith, 1998; 
Youngs, 2001; Zanger, 2000). The Union’s own half-hearted attempts at applying 
conditionality in practice seem to suggest that it, too, has been aware of this. The EU’s 
discouraging track record in conditioning Russia’s policy in Chechnya is a case in point 
(see Haukkala, 2001, esp. pp. 51–62; and Forsberg and Herd, 2005), and Ukraine 
especially during the reign of the president Leonid Kuchma is another (Wolczuk, 2004). 
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy can be seen as having a dual function: On the one 
hand it is an attempt to devise an alternative to further enlargements of the Union. On the 
other hand it is an attempt at (re)injecting the Union’s normative agenda and the 
application of conditionality more strongly also to the relations with non-candidate 
countries (see Kelley, 2006; Dannreuther, 2006). As such, it is a conscious attempt at 
squaring the circle of relinquishing enlargement while retaining the Union’s normative 
power in Europe. These aims were present already in the Commission’s first blueprint 
concerning the policy, presented in March 2003 (European Commission, 2003). The 
communication clearly stated that the new policy was meant for countries that did not 
enjoy the perspective of EU membership. However, the document took great pains to 
make the case that the Eastern enlargement was not about exclusion and new dividing 
lines in Europe but that it would bring tangible benefits also to the new neighbours. At 
the heart of the initiative was the EU’s offer of enhanced relations and closer integration 
based on shared values between the Union and its neighbours. The mechanism is simple: 
in return for effective implementation of reforms (including aligning national legislation 
with the EU acquis), the EU will grant closer economic integration with its partners. The 
approach is twofold, as the EU wanted first to tap the full potential of the already existing 
PCAs, namely the gradual harmonization of legal norms with the EU acquis and the 
creation of a free trade area, and only then move beyond with the prospect of realizing 
the so-called four freedoms (persons, goods, services, and capital) within the “Wider   13




The concept was further developed in the Commission’s strategy paper in May 2004 
(European Commission, 2004). The paper largely reiterated the points of departure of the 
earlier communication but it went further by identifying better the priorities and how to 
inscribe them into the neighbourhood action plans to be jointly adopted with the 
neighbours. The paper also envisaged a process based on clear differentiation between 
countries and regular monitoring of progress. It is, however, here that the Union’s attempt 
at normative hegemony also in its neighbourhood becomes clearly visible, as the process 
is built on a set of bilateral relationships between the individual neighbours and the EU. 
Scholars seem to be in agreement that this is a deliberate choice on the part of the Union 
to maximize its leverage over the neighbours (Smith, 2005, pp. 762–63; Joenniemi and 
Browning, 2005; and Vahl, 2005). Moreover, according to the strategy the Union does 
not give any meaningful say to the neighbours in setting the normative agenda: The 
objectives and the means are non-negotiable and the only place where the partners would 
be consulted is when the individual action plans with clear benchmarks and timetables 
are being agreed upon. As such, the Union is offering (or withholding) economic benefits 
depending on the neighbours’ ability and willingness to implement the Union’s 
normative agenda and the EU is willing to give its neighbours influence only over when 
they want to implement the Union’s demands and not how that is to be done (see also 
Bicchi, 2006).
10 In sum, it seems evident that the neighbours are not likely to have a large 
say in matters that will have a profound effect on their future development and place in 
Europe. If this stance is accompanied by a persistent neglect of the neighbours’ calls for 
belonging and their claims of Europeanness, the application of the Union’s normative 
hegemony through the ENP can be seen as resting on a fairly dubious legitimacy.  
 
In fact, and unlike in the case of enlargement, the ENP would seem to reveal the uglier 
face of the Union’s normative power as one based on domination. To quote Lukes, the 
exercise of power is understood as a form of domination when it “is the ability to 
constrain the choices of others, coercing them or securing their compliance, by 
impending them from living as their own nature and judgment dictate” (Lukes, 
1974/2005, p. 85). By denying its neighbours’ calls for belonging and demanding that 
they nevertheless conform to its norms and values, the Union can be seen as acting 
precisely in this way. This does not necessarily have to entail that the EU is somehow 
evil, however. The reverse can be the case, as the exercise of domination can be done 
with the best and kindest of intentions, with the well-being of the dominated in mind 
(Ibid., p. 83). In fact, this seems to be the Union’s own line of reasoning with its 
representatives repeatedly stating how the very ENP process is beneficial for the 
neighbours themselves regardless whether their wishes for accession are eventually 
heeded or not (see Ferrero-Waldner, 2006a; 2006b; Landaburu, 2006; and Wissels, 
                                                 
9 Since 2003 the Commission’s blueprint has gone through several substantive transformations: Its name 
was changed from “Wider Europe” to “European Neighbourhood Policy.” Also the list of countries has 
changed, as Russia – due to its own insistence – was dropped from the initiative, whereas the countries of 
Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) have been added to the list of “neighbours.” 
10 Or, in the words of Metallica: “You can do it your own way, if it’s done just how I say.”   14
2006). But despite the rhetoric, the ENP amounts to little else than what Hettne and 
Söderbaum (2005, p. 539) have called “soft imperialism,” i.e. to soft (or normative) 
power being applied in a hard (or hegemonic) way through an asymmetric relationship 
that advocates a one-sided reading of norms and values without engaging the receiving 
end in a genuine dialogue about the content and meaning of those terms. 
 
But the crux of the issue lies elsewhere; it lies in the fact that the EU has been trying to 
apply its normative hegemony in Europe along the lines of accession process without the 
legitimising effect of enlargement. It should be clear from the discussion above that this 
is a recipe for failure, unless the ENP is made on the material side of incentives enticing 
enough for the neighbours. Thus far this has not been the case and it is unlikely that the 
economic side of ENP can be robust enough to act as a sufficient incentive for the 
neighbours in the future, either (Milcher and Slay, 2005, p. 7). Despite the grand total of 
€12 billion devoted to the neighbourhood in the current budgetary period in the EU 
(2007−13) it is clear that the sum is in no proportion to the scale of challenges the Union 
is facing in its combined neighbourhoods in the South and the East. In addition, the long 
term overall malaise in European economic performance will be reflected in the future 
allocation of resources. The euro zone’s economy has been stalling for several years, and 
the EU is no longer generating the kind of resources that it could use to throw its 
substantial economic weight around – at least beyond its own borders. It is equally 
dubious whether the Union is able to provide its neighbours with the kind of market 
access that would be required, especially in the East. The French and Dutch rejections of 
the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 reflected the rise of anti-liberalism and neo-
protectionism in the EU. It is unlikely that the vested interests within the Union will 
allow the Commission to open the Union’s internal market to the products from the East 
that would be most competitive there. For example, Ukraine’s and Moldova’s main 
exports are steel and agricultural products, both commodities that the liberalisation of 
which would face staunch opposition from within the Union (Grabbe, 2001, p. 8; Milcher 
and Slay, 2005, p. 9). As a consequence, it could well be that neither aid nor trade will be 
forthcoming from the EU in the coming years. What is more, an article written in an 
unofficial capacity by two members of the Commission unwittingly reveals how most of 
the expected economic benefits of the ENP would actually flow towards the Union with 
significant potential risks of over-regulation and market shocks in the offing for the 
neighbours themselves (see Dodini and Fantini, 2006). 
 
Therefore, it can be doubted whether the ENP in its current form is the answer the 
European Union has been hoping for. A case in point is Ukraine, a country that since 
early 1990s has been oscillating between the two main vectors of its foreign policy: the 
European Union and the Russian Federation. Leonid Kuchma’s presidency (1994–2004) 
saw the schizophrenic situation of continued professions of Ukraine’s European calling 
without a commensurate display of its vocation in terms of actual economic and societal 
reforms that would have facilitated the country’s claim of being a suitable candidate for 
accession (for a fascinating account of Europe as a vocation and a calling, see Medvedev, 
1998). Thus when the ENP process was launched in earnest in 2004, the Union had an   15
easy time in putting Ukraine to the same basket together with other laggards in its Eastern 
periphery, Belarus and Moldova.
11 
 
Ukraine’s initial reaction to the ENP was that of indignation for being put in the same 
basket with clearly non-European countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East 
(Gromadzki and Sushko, 2005, p. 6). But Kyiv decided to pursue a pragmatic stance, 
preferring to view the ENP as a short-term solution and seeking to push towards closer 
forms of association and even membership (Solonenko 2006, p. 44). Keeping this 
background in mind, it is hardly surprising that the negotiations for the neighbourhood 
action plan with Ukraine in 2004 were protracted and difficult. Kuchma’s government 
was clearly dissatisfied with the Union’s offer. The EU, for its part, however, was equally 
adamant that the package was as good as it would get (Solonenko, 2006, p. 46). However, 
after the dramatic presidential elections in November–December 2004, the domestic 
situation changed in Ukraine: The new President Victor Yuschenko has not only 
continued the pro-EU rhetoric of Kuchma but has augmented it with a series of reforms 
that, if implemented, could lead the country to a path towards EU membership 
(Gromadzki et al., 2005). But even under the most promising of circumstances Ukraine’s 
path to Europe would be far from linear. The biggest obstacle on Ukraine’s road to 
modernisation and europeanisation lies in country’s weak institutional framework: as in 
Russia, state institutions have become hostage and tools of economic interest groups 
which hinder and obstruct reforms that threaten their power and prosperity (Deutsche 
Bank, 2005, pp. 4 and 7). The situation has not changed much for the better under 
Yuschenko whose reformist drive has become the hostage of the inertia of the corrupt 
bureaucrats and oligarchs. Arguably, for the current elites to relinquish their crony 
capitalism for good it would take a significant incentive structure on the part of the Union 
(Larrabee, 2006, pp. 94, 97; Wolczuk, 2006, pp. 8−9). 
 
But the original action plan negotiated with Kuchma was thin on such incentives: no 
significant trade liberalisation, visa facilitation or market economy status for Ukraine – 
things the Union has been willing to consider and implement, for example, vis-à-vis 
Russia. Instead, the action plan contained an exhaustive list of priorities and objectives 
the Union expected Ukraine to implement (for longer discussions, see Gromadzki and 
Sushko, 2005; and Smith, 2005). In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution the EU has 
not been forthcoming with new initiatives, either. After his victory, Yuschenko sought to 
challenge the Union to embrace the new democratic Ukraine – rhetoric that has been 
sustained to this day (Kuzio, 2006, p. 89; for the President’s own recent views, see 
Yuschenko, 2007). But already in early 2005 he was brought from the election euphoria 
to the ground by the Union’s take-it-or-leave-it approach: There was no room for 
renegotiation of the action plan which was subsequently adopted on 21 February 2005 
(Gromadzki et al., 2005, p. 7). Ukraine’s European aspirations were not met with an 
unequivocal nod of confirmation from the EU, either. As if to sweeten the bitter pill, on 
the day of its adoption, the High Representative Javier Solana and the External Relations 
Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner did publish a 10-point letter specifying additional 
measures to further strengthen the action plan. But a team of analysts have deemed the 
                                                 
11 To be precise, although mentioned in the ENP documents, the Union has decided to exclude Belarus 
from the process due to the policies of the country’s authoritarian president Alexander Lukashenko.   16
letter of being little else than a list of unilateral demands on Ukraine with little and vague 
or non-binding substance on the Union (Gromadzki et al., 2005, pp. 18–9). In short, the 
burden for the future development of the relations has been put squarely on Ukraine’s 
shoulders while the incentives for doing so remain fairly limited, at least for the time 
being. What is more, Ukraine’s newly-found democratic credentials together with its 
European vocation have basically been ignored (Kuzio, 2006).  
 
In sum, it is unlikely that the package put forward by the Union – no European 
perspective and only limited material incentives – would prod Ukraine along the road of 
convergence and integration with the EU; i.e. help the Union to realise its normative 
agenda in the case of one of its largest neighbours. Once again, a clear membership 
perspective would the best anchor for Ukraine (Deutsche Bank, 2005, p. 9; Gromadzki et 
al., 2005; and Wolczuk 2004; 2006). What is more, it seems clear that the Union’s 
current ambiguity and vacillation only manages to undercut the pro-European reformist 
forces in Ukraine (Kuzio, 2006, p. 105). As a consequence, it is likely that with its 
current ENP the Union’s normative power is set to remain under-utilised and its 
normative agenda largely unrealized. 
 
These same trends can be detected also in the Union’s wider neighbourhood with 
neighbours themselves showing signs of frustration with the ENP (Vahl, 2005, p. 57; 
Harpaz, 2007). But there are some sings that indicate that there is growing awareness 
concerning the inherent constraints faced by the ENP also in the Union. For example, 
Kelley (2006) has traced the dilution of conditionality attached to the policy from the 
initial rigid application of benchmarks and monitoring akin to accession process to the 
more recent “intentional ambiguity” where the Union hopes to spur a modicum of 
reforms whilst acknowledging the relatively thin set of incentives at the ENP’s disposal 
currently. This change is to be detected in the Commission’s most recent communication 
on the topic from December 2006, which – while re-iterating the main characteristics of 
the ENP discussed above – acknowledges that the EU itself must be forthcoming with a 
more “robust” ENP in terms of actual incentives while simultaneously enhancing 
dialogue with its partners enabling their views to be heard as well (European 
Commission, 2006b). Recently, the Union has indeed adopted a slightly more 
accommodating stance when it comes to the actual incentives. An interesting case is 
Ukraine, where the EU has taken some practical steps that can be seen as meeting some 
of the long-standing Ukrainian demands. For example, the 10
th EU−Ukraine in Helsinki 
in October 2006 initialled a draft agreement on visa facilitation that Ukraine was denied 
in the original ENP action plan a year earlier. But despite this apparent concession, a 
group of commentators have seen it as a “questionable achievement” at best as it does not 
meet the Ukrainian hopes for closer integration in full (Boratyński et al., 2006). This 
brings us back to the gist of the argument: by severing the link with enlargement in the 
ENP, the Union is facing severe obstacles in its continued attempts at regional normative 
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Conclusions 
 
In the aftermath of the “Big Bang” enlargement, the geographical limits of the European 
project seem to be approaching, and the EU is increasingly threatening with the idea of 
ceasing to enlarge. As a consequence, in the external relations of the Union, the 
exclusionary aspects of European integration are coming to the fore, while the question of 
how to alleviate the negative impact of relinquishing the most effective foreign policy 
tool at EU’s disposal is emerging. At stake is the Union’s ability to act as a normative 
power – or hegemon – in Europe, which is crucially dependent on the EU’s perceived 
legitimacy in the eyes of its partners. 
 
It has been argued in this paper that the open-ended nature of the Union’s membership is 
a key factor in promoting this legitimacy. As such, the Union’s attempts at divorcing its 
normative power from the accession process in Europe can be seen as being 
counterproductive. Yet the Union has several reasons for ceasing – or at least pausing – 
to enlarge. The recent accessions of twelve new members have resulted in a need for a 
gestation period. Also the new Eastern neighbours, at least in their present form, are 
anything but easily integrated. 
 
For the Union, the new European Neighbourhood Policy thus represents both the 
avoidance and continuation of enlargement by other means. Avoidance, as it is hoped that 
it would enable the Union to avoid for the foreseeable future answering their demands for 
belonging; continuation, as the Union has built the ENP on the same logic of normative 
hegemony as the accession process. It is hoped that this would facilitate the emergence of 
an increasingly democratic and prosperous “ring of friends” around the Union with which 
it would be willing to share “everything but institutions.”  
 
Although the offer sounds generous, the current format is far from a panacea. As has 
been argued in this paper, the ambiguity concerning the limits of Europe is not working. 
Instead, it is eroding the legitimacy on which the Union’s normative hegemony crucially 
rests. Moreover, one could argue that after a rather disastrous decade in the 1990s in the 
EU’s new Eastern neighbours, they might not opt for increased “fuzziness” in their 
immediate surroundings. In fact, the opposite could be true, as after all the recent 
turbulence they might prefer clear institutional ties and mechanisms (including, of course, 
the financial support) that a full membership would provide them. 
 
By demanding reforms right now and offering only vague and amorphous incentives 
somewhere down the line, the ENP puts the veritable cart before its neighbours’ horses 
with no tangible carrot in sight.
12 The material benefits are not strong enough to entice 
the elites in the new Eastern neighbours to change the current system that is skewed in 
their favour. But even if the ENP was made financially robust enough to act as an 
economic carrot, it does not answer their calls for belonging in full. A case in point is 
Ukraine, which has to no avail repeatedly voiced her hopes of becoming a full EU 
member as soon as possible.  
                                                 
12 This is not unique in the Union’s external policies, however. Tovias and Ugur (2000, p. 412) have shown 
how the “Euro-Med Partnership” in the South has been based on exactly the same logic.   18
 
One can envisage two ways forward for the Union. The first is the continuation of 
enlargement(s). After all, it seems to be the only avenue through which the Union can 
project its normative power in a legitimate and efficient manner in Europe. This would 
also tie in with the ENP’s own paradoxical logic. As Hillion has pointed out, the better 
the ENP works the less sustainable it actually becomes (Hillion, 2005, p. 23). With the 
neighbours becoming increasingly EU compatible, also the shadow of enlargement looms 
larger. This does not need to be a problem, however. But it reinforces the main point in 
this article: it is the enlargement that is the key to the Union’s normative power in Europe 
and any neighbourhood policy that fails to take this issue into account is doomed to be 
sub-optimal one. If this road was pursued then Ukraine’s European aspiration should be 
deemed as legitimate and a gradual step-by-step association and integration process 
should begin (this is in fact exactly what a group of experts advocate in Gromadzki et al., 
2005). Therefore Turkey’s long winding road to Europe could also be Ukraine’s. The EU 
should expect Moldova, Georgia and other countries of Southern Caucasus to follow suit 
as well. 
 
The second is that the EU should perhaps reconsider its normative hegemony in the post-
enlargement Europe. The paradox of the EU’s own pan-European rhetoric is that its 
application of the third dimension of power has resulted in its neighbours wanting the 
wrong thing: they want the membership when the EU would want them to have the same 
norms and values that the Union has. To be fair, the EU has tried to find a way out of this 
conundrum by repeatedly emphasising the inclusive aspects of the ENP without however 
realising that in Europe the legitimacy of its attempts is linked with the accession 
perspective. In this respect, the ENP is not a powerful enough a tool for the Union to 
allow it to turn the issue of membership into a “non-decision” (cf. Bachrach and Baratz, 
1963; see also Lukes 1974/2005). 
 
This would entail changing the neighbourhood policy, or at least the priorities within it. 
The current approach is not substantial enough to warrant the attempts at regional 
normative hegemony and the Union’s insistence that the neighbours should engage 
themselves in adopting large parts of the acquis without the full European perspective. 
Instead, the Union should consider a neighbourhood policy that is based less on heavy 
normative convergence and harmonization and more on tangible cooperation with more 
modest rhetoric and clearer material incentives. After all, what is the point of insisting on 
a high level of conformity with the EU acquis if these countries are not to become full 
members in the foreseeable future? One should also keep in mind that often even within 
the Union it is the case that even if common rules and regulations are formally adopted 
they are in practice implemented in a rather slow and haphazard manner (Zielonka, 2001, 
p. 513). If the EU can deal with this internal messiness, maybe it could let the thousand 
flowers bloom in its neighbourhood and instead of detailed normative convergence to 
concentrate on fostering the overall values and norms that matter as prerequisites for 
good governance: democracy, rule of law, and basic human rights. This would ease the 
burden of the Union’s normative hegemony and would give the Union added and badly 
needed legitimacy, as it could tie its agenda to the wider normative geography in Europe 
that already consists of other institutions, such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe.   19
In essence, this would require the toning down of the Union’s pan-European rhetoric and 
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